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As Hume says, the definitions are "presenting a different view of the same object." (T 1.3.14.31; SBN 170) Supporting this, Harold Noonan holds that D1 is "what is going on in the world" and that D2 is "what goes on in the mind of the observer" and therefore, "the problem of nonequivalent definitions poses no real problem for understanding Hume." (Noonan 1999: 150-151) Simon Blackburn provides a similar interpretation that the definitions are doing two different things, externally and internally. " (T 1.3.6.12; SBN 92, emphasis mine) In granting such a mechanism, we grant Hume the epistemic propriety of affirming something reason cannot establish. It seems to be the laws governing cause and effect that provide support for predictions, as human reason tries to reduce particular natural phenomena "… As we experience enough cases of a particular constant conjunction, our minds begin to pass a natural determination from cause to effect, adding a little more "oomph" to the prediction of the effect every time, a growing certitude that the effect will follow again. D1 reduces causation to proximity, continuity, and constant conjunction, and D2 similarly reduces causation to proximity, continuity, and the internal mental determination that moves the first object or idea to the second.

Thus, objections like: Under a Humean account, the toddler who burned his hand would not fear the flame after only one such occurrence because he has not experienced a constant conjunction, are unfair to Hume, as the toddler would have had thousands of experiences of the principle that like causes like, and could thus employ resemblance to reach the conclusion to fear the flame. Here, he defends the Humean skeptical realism that he considers necessary for other strands of Hume’s philosophy. In both the Treatise and the Enquiry, we find Hume’s Fork, his bifurcation of all possible objects of knowledge into relations of ideas and matters of fact. The relation of cause and effect is pivotal in reasoning, which Hume defines as the discovery of relations between objects of comparison. But note that when Hume says "objects", at least in the context of reasoning, he is referring to the objects of the mind, that is, ideas and impressions, since Hume adheres to the Early Modern "way of ideas", the belief that sensation is a mental event and therefore all objects of perception are mental. Two objects can be constantly conjoined without our mind determining that one causes the other, and it seems possible that we can be determined that one object causes another without their being constantly conjoined.

Nevertheless, ‘causation’ carries a stronger connotation than this, for constant conjunction can be accidental and therefore doesn’t get us the necessary connection that gives the relation of cause and effect its predictive ability. Peeling the Opponent to get a Stronger Leave, Dave Kibble explains. Laurie was a young lover, but he was in earnest, and meant to `have it out', if he died in the attempt, so he plunged into the subject with characteristic impetuousity, saying in a voice that would get choky now and then, in spite of manful efforts to keep it steady . A gloriously beautiful heroine of a discreditable adventure I must in justice admit that she was; but that fact has only this importance: her beauty was such a surprise to me that it cast a doubt upon her identity with the young woman I had seen before; how could the marvelous fascination of her face have failed to strike me at that time? Some cannot. Cause and effect is one of the three philosophical relations that afford us less than certain knowledge, the other two being identity and situation. But causation itself must be a relation rather than a quality of an object, as there is no one property common to all causes or to all effects.

But invoking this common type of necessity is trivial or circular when it is this very efficacy that Hume is attempting to discover. What is this necessity that is implied by causation? Having approached Hume’s account of causality by this route, we are now in a position to see where Hume’s two definitions of causation given in the Treatise come from. In fact, such an interpretation might better explain Hume’s dissatisfaction over the definitions. Though for Hume, this is true by definition for all matters of fact, he also appeals to our own experience to convey the point. A true statement must be one or the other, but not both, since its negation must either imply a contradiction or not. Hume gives several differentiae distinguishing the two, but the principal distinction is that the denial of a true relation of ideas implies a contradiction. But if the denial of a causal statement is still conceivable, then its truth must be a matter of fact, and must therefore be in some way dependent upon experience.

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