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Why they cannot move their opponent's ball if it is in the way, or if it prevents them from placing their ball in the spot they require, or leave it alone if it does not, it is impossible to say. We can never claim knowledge of category (B) D. M. Armstrong reads Hume this way, seeing Hume’s reductivist account of necessity and its implications for laws of nature as ultimately leading him to skepticism. One way to interpret the reasoning behind assigning Hume the position of causal skepticism is by assigning similar import to the passages emphasized by the reductionists, but interpreting the claims epistemically rather than ontologically. Since we never directly experience power, all causal claims certainly appear susceptible to the Problem of Induction. They only claim that we have no clear and distinct idea of power, or that what is clearly and distinctly conceived is merely constant conjunction.

In considering the foundations for predictions, however, we must remember that, for Hume, only the relation of cause and effect gives us predictive power, as it alone allows us to go beyond memory and the senses. But again, (A) by itself gives us no predictive power. Though Hume gives a quick version of the Problem in the middle of his discussion of causation in the Treatise (T 1.3.6), it is laid out most clearly in Section IV of the Enquiry. The last is some mechanism by which to overcome the skeptical challenges Hume himself raises. Instead, it is an instinctive mechanism that we share with animals. T 1.3.2.11; SBN 77) In short, a reduction to D1 ignores the mental determination component. A reductive emphasis on D1 as definitive ignores not only D2 as a definition but also ignores all of the argument leading up to it. The motivation for this interpretation seems to be an emphasis on Hume’s D1, either by saying that it is the only definition that Hume genuinely endorses, or that D2 somehow collapses into D1 or that D2 does not represent a genuine ontological reduction, and is therefore not relevant to the metaphysics of causation.

This focus on D1 is regarded as deeply problematic by some Hume scholars (Francis Dauer, H.O. Therefore, whether or not the projectivism of D2 actually is relevant to the metaphysics of causation, a strong case can be made that Hume thinks it is so, and therefore an accurate historical interpretation needs to include D2 in order to capture Hume’s intentions. By putting the two definitions at center state, Hume can plausibly be read as emphasizing that our only notion of causation is constant conjunction with certitude that it will continue. Since the Problem of Induction demands that causal connections cannot be known a priori, and that our access is only to constant conjunction, the Problem seems to require the most crucial components of his account of necessity. In addition to its accounting for the necessity of causation mentioned above, recall that Hume makes frequent reference to both definitions as accurate or just, and at one point even refers to D2 as constituting the essence of causation. It started with Norman Kemp Smith’s The Philosophy of David Hume, and defends the view that Hume is a causal realist, a position that entails the denial of both causal reductionism and causal skepticism by maintaining that the truth value of causal statements is not reducible to non-causal states of affairs and that they are in principle, knowable.

We use direct observation to draw conclusions about unobserved states of affairs. By limiting causation to constant conjunction, we are incapable of grounding causal inference; hence Humean inductive skepticism. In the external world, causation simply is the regularity of constant conjunction. Causation so far as we know about it in the objects. The kinetic energy of the objects before the collision is not the same after the collision. Armstrong 1983: 4) J. L. Mackie similarly stresses that, "It is about causation so far as we know about it in objects that Hume has the firmest and most fully argued views," (Mackie 1980: 21) and it is for this reason that he focuses on D1. Against the positions of causal reductionism and causal skepticism is the New Hume tradition. It is therefore not entirely clear how Hume views the relationship between his account of necessity and the Problem. If Hume’s account is intended to be epistemic, then the Problem of induction can be seen as taking Hume’s insights about our impressions of necessity to an extreme but reasonable conclusion. A MP3 file can be found in the game directory. Once the suits are assigned, they remain fixed throughout the game.

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